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1 Introduction
There is broad consensus that consumers typically benefit from the enforce-
ment of antitrust laws. However, it is less clear whether producers actually
suffer from the reduced opportunity to increase profits by collusion. For
instance, Selten (1984) shows that, under free entry and exit, cartel laws
prohibiting collusion are not necessarily bad for business: When collusion
is effectively prevented, there are fewer competitors, and active producers
make higher profits on average than when they collude.1
More recent work by Sutton (1991, 1998) also emphasizes that the equi-
librium number of firms tends to decrease when the intensity of product-
market competition increases. In particular, Sutton’s analysis demonstrates
that there is a robust relation between the intensity of product-market com-
petition and concentration in industries where sunk costs are exogenous :
There is a lower bound to concentration that unambiguously increases with
the intensity of product-market competition. That is, the higher the in-
tensity of product-market competition, the lower the equilibrium number
of firms that may be supported by this market. The picture is less clear,
however, for industries with endogenous sunk costs; that is, firms bear sig-
nificant costs for advertising or research and development (R&D) before
competing in the product market. In this case, the effect of more intense
product-market competition on concentration can go either way.2
It is probably fair to say that the empirical evidence on the relation
of product-market competition and concentration is rather scant and has
produced mixed results (see Elliot and Gribbin 1977, O’Brien et al. 1979,
and Bittlingmayer 1985). The lack of clear evidence is unsurprising, given
the difficulties associated with measuring the intensity of product-market
competition and handling the notorious endogeneity problems in industry
studies. In a recent analysis of the impact of antitrust policy on concen-
tration in the U.K., Symeonidis (2000b) has circumvented these problems
by adopting a “natural experiment” framework, viewing the introduction
of cartel policy as an exogenous event.3 His results support the notion that
more intense product-market competition increases concentration in both
exogenous and endogenous sunk-cost industries.
1See Phlips (1995, Ch. 3) for a textbook discussion of Selten’s argument.
2Symeonidis (2000a, Property 1) illustrates this ambiguity in the setting of a linear
Cournot model with quality indices, where concentration is likely to decrease (increase)
in the neighborhood of perfect collusion (the non-collusive Nash equilibrium, respec-
tively).
3See Meyer (1995) on the use of natural and quasi-experiments in economics.
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In the present paper, we focus on a closely related question that has
largely been ignored in the previous literature: How does an (exogenous)
increase in the intensity of competition affect a firm’s exit probability?
We think this is a natural question to ask, as one might expect exits
to increase—at least temporarily—when product-market competition be-
comes more intense. Also, taking the perspective of an individual firm
allows us to sidestep the nontrivial problem of constructing useful concen-
tration measures across a large number of diverse industries.4
Following Symeonidis (2000b), we adopt a natural-experiment approach
to analyze the impact of a major change in Swiss antitrust law in July
1996 on exit probabilities. More specifically, we compare the impact on
the “treatment group” of non-exporting firms facing little competition in
domestic markets with the impact on a “control group” of exporting firms
operating under international competition. In doing so, we exploit the
dualistic nature of the Swiss economy with competitive export industries
and highly cartelized domestic industries (see Borner et al. 1995).5
Earlier work by Klepper and Graddy (1990), Agarwal and Gort (1996),
and Van Kranenburg et al. (2002) suggests that a firm’s exit probability
should depend on firm-specific characteristics—such as a firm’s size, age,
location, and so on—as well as on industry-specific and macroeconomic
conditions. To our knowledge, Van Kranenburg et al. (2002) is the only
paper that has analyzed the relationship between the intensity of product-
market competition and exit rates. These authors use the (lagged) number
of competitors in the daily newspaper industry under consideration as a
proxy for the intensity of product-market competition, and they find that
exit rates tend to increase with the intensity of competition.
From the perspective of the literature discussed above, the number of
competitors in any given industry is likely to be a good proxy for the
intensity of product-market competition only if the number of firms may
be treated as an exogenous variable; that is, if it is safe to assume that
firms cannot decide about entry or exit. In contrast, if the number of firms
4For instance, the well-known m-firm concentration ratio, which adds up the m high-
est market shares in the industry (see, e.g., Tirole 1988, 221), will not react to liquida-
tions or mergers of smaller firms.
5It would be desirable to adopt a similar approach to analyze the effect on entry.
However, such an analysis is possible only for prespecified categories (such as industries
or regions), and not at the firm level, since firms are inexistent before entry. Yet, it
is very difficult to classify specific categories as exporting or non-exporting, since there
are non-negligible numbers of exporting and non-exporting firms in each category (see
Table 1). Furthermore, we are not aware of sufficient data on entry in Switzerland.
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is endogenous, a high intensity of product-market competition is associated
with a small equilibrium number of firms, as only a small number of firms
may be supported by the profits available in this market. That is, relative
to the case where the number of firms is exogenous, the chain of causation
between the number of firms and the intensity of downstream competition
is reversed. In particular, we should expect that the intensity of product-
market competition is high (rather than low) when the number of firms is
small. With this in mind, we think that it is natural to view the number
of firms as being endogenous in a study of firms exiting the market.
For this study, we use a large combined data set that has become avail-
able only recently. Part of the data comes from the Swiss Business Census,
which is a complete inventory count encompassing approximately 297,000
firms. This census contains information on the characteristics of active
firms at the time of the inventory count (in September 1995), including
their age, location, legal form, number of employees, and export share.
The data on the firms’ exits were provided by Dun & Bradstreet, which
has compiled a comprehensive database covering three different types of
exits: (i) bankruptcy, (ii) voluntary liquidations, and (iii) mergers.
Employing a Cox (1972, 1975) model with time-varying covariates, we
obtain the following main results. First, the tightening of Swiss antitrust
legislation in 1996 had a strong temporary impact on firm conduct, rais-
ing hazard rates for the full sample significantly. Second, whereas non-
exporting firms experienced a significant increase in hazard rates, exporting
firms already exposed to international competition were not significantly
affected by the change in antitrust legislation. The significant temporary
increase in exit rates supports the notion that the tightening of antitrust
legislation in July 1996 led to an increase in the intensity of competition
within Switzerland. Third, our findings with respect to the remaining de-
terminants of hazard rates—firm- and industry-specific properties as well
as macroeconomic conditions—are in line with previous literature. In par-
ticular, we find that hazard rates tend to decrease in age and size.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
brief discussion of the change in antitrust policy in Switzerland. Section 3
describes the data set and variables. Section 4 sets out the empirical model
and discusses our main results. Section 5 concludes.
3
Buehler et al.: Competition Policy and Exit Rates
2 The Change in Swiss Antitrust Policy
Traditionally, Swiss antitrust policy was perceived as being very permissive
(see, e.g., Porter 1990, 714). In part, the lax attitude of Swiss antitrust
authorities towards anticompetitive conduct can be explained by the fact
that the Swiss constitution makes it difficult to declare cartels unlawful.
Before the revision of Swiss antitrust law in 1996, antitrust authorities
were required to go through a rather opaque process called the “balance
method” (Saldomethode) to evaluate the costs and benefits of a particular
(mis)conduct, with considerations such as the impact on the labor market of
specific regions routinely playing an important role. Since it generally was
very difficult to prove that a cartel actually had a negative “net benefit”,
cartels were rarely prohibited. Neven and Ungern-Sternberg (1997, 36)
describe the performance of Swiss competition policy up to the mid 1990s
as follows:
“In the past, the [Cartel] Commission has relied far too
much on judgements and far too little on sound analysis. In
various dimensions (definition of relevant markets, evaluation
of dominance, evaluation of countervailing benefits, imposition
of remedies), the analysis is rather poor by the standards of
other jurisdictions. It lacks organising principles, fails to bring
appropriate evidence and often relies on highly judgmental eval-
uations.”
Emphasizing the need for a thorough revision of Swiss antitrust law,
Borner et al. (1995) further pointed out that the Swiss economy featured
dualistic characteristics : On the one hand, there was the competitive ex-
port sector serving world markets; on the other hand, there was a highly
subsidized domestic sector facing little competition due to a mixture of
public regulations and collusion.
The revision of the antitrust law analyzed in this paper was implemented
on July 1, 1996. It finally led to the prohibition of so-called “hard” cartels
that eliminate “effective competition” by fixing prices, restricting quantity,
or dividing up markets (Art. 7). Furthermore, the balance method was
abolished. These improvements were expected to considerably intensify
competition in domestic markets, even though there arguably remained a
number of relevant shortcomings—the competition authorities lacked the
power to penalize offenders without delay and to confiscate extra profits
4
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from unlawful behavior (OECD 2000).6
This rather drastic change in Swiss antitrust legislation allows us to
study the effect of intensifying product-market competition on firms’ exit
behavior using a natural-experiment framework: The change in antitrust
legislation generated variation in the intensity of product-market compe-
tition that is plausibly exogenous (Meyer 1995). We can thus sidestep
the well-known endogeneity problem of structure and performance studies
(Schmalensee 1989).
To evaluate the impact of the change in antitrust law on firms’ exit
behavior, we rely on the dichotomy of the Swiss economy and distinguish
two types of firms:
• The vast majority of Swiss firms was active solely in domestic mar-
kets; that is, they did not export to foreign countries (“non-exporting
firms”). These firms should have been significantly affected by the
change in antitrust legislation.
• A smaller, albeit relevant, number of Swiss firms exported at least
part of their output to the world market (“exporting firms”). The
impact of the change in Swiss antitrust law on these firms should
have been smaller, as they already faced intense competition in inter-
national markets. In particular, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
exporting firms were not significantly affected by the change in Swiss
antitrust legislation.
3 Data and Variables
In this section, we briefly discuss our data and the variables used to estimate
the impact of the change in antitrust law on firms’ exit probabilities.
3.1 Data Source and Sample Composition
For the purpose of this study, we merged the following databases:
(i) Swiss Business Census (SBC 95). The SBC 95 is a complete inventory
count compiled by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS), which
contains all firms with more than 20 weekly aggregate working hours
6Eliminating these and other shortcomings was the objective of yet another revision
of the antitrust law enacted in April 2004.
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existing in September 1995, excluding the agricultural sector. The
SBC 95 provides numerous variables that characterize the attributes
of these firms (as of September 1995).
(ii) Dun & Bradstreet Exit Database (DBED). The DBED contains all ex-
its of firms registered in Switzerland from January 1994 to December
2000. It distinguishes the following types of exit: (i) bankruptcies,
(ii) voluntary liquidations, and (iii) mergers.
The merged database covers an observation period from October 1995
to December 2000. After deleting all firms that were non-profit oriented
according to their legal status—such as cooperatives (“Genossenschaften”),
associations and clubs (“Vereine”), foundations (“Stiftungen”), churches,
embassies and international organizations—the merged database contained
276,123 firms. Since for sole proprietorships, the DBED does not fully
cover voluntary liquidations and mergers, we dropped all sole proprietor-
ships. Furthermore, we dropped all firms established prior to 1970, since
no information on their founding dates was available.
After dropping these firms, our sample is still comprehensive and in-
cludes more than 70,000 firms. In particular, we have firms of all sizes that
have been in business from one to 25 years in our data set, which rarely
has been the case in previous studies. In addition, with the exception of
the agricultural sector, our sample contains all industries represented in
Switzerland (including services), whereas earlier work typically focused on
only a few industries and did not cover services due to data limitations.
However, we are aware of two disadvantages of our database, both of
which are associated with the way entries and exits were recorded. First,
whereas the DBED records exit times as exact dates (day/month/year),
the SBC 95 gives entry dates in intervals only (various time spans).7 One
approach towards dealing with this problem in survival analysis is the use of
interval-censored models. However, these models are not designed to handle
time-varying covariates (changes within the intervals), which will be crucial
for our analysis below. We therefore adopted the alternative approach of
assuming a uniform distribution of entries within these intervals (since no
further information was available) and simulating the date of entry, which
yielded survival times measured in quarters. Second, it is well-known that
firms tend to announce voluntary liquidations with some delay (i.e., after
7Entries were recorded in the following nine intervals (..., 1969], [1970,1980],
[1981,1985], [1986,1990], [1991], [1992], [1993], [1994], [1995].
6
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 4 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 15
closing down operations), giving rise to delays in registration. This is an
inherent problem of business failures studies.
It is instructive to compare the composition of our sample with that
of a related study by Harhoff et al. (1998) for West Germany, which is
similar to ours in a number of respects: First, it contains manufacturing
as well as service firms, unlike the vast majority of other studies. Second,
these authors observe bankruptcies and voluntary liquidations. Third, they
have older firms in the sample that were at risk before the survey period
(“delayed entry”). Finally, their observation period is of a similar length
as ours.8
We now highlight some special properties of our sample. The descriptive
statistics given in Table 1 indicate that small firms make up a large pro-
portion of Swiss firms: Using the number of employees (Emp) to measure
firm size, the average size of non-exporting firms is about 10 employees,
whereas the average size of exporting firms is about 14 employees.
Recall from our above discussion that firms founded before 1970 had to
be excluded from our sample due to data limitations. It is thus unsurprising
that, on average, firms were only about 8 years old when they entered the
survey period, whereas they were roughly 29 years old in Harhoff et al. The
firms in our sample are thus relatively young.
We further find that, after excluding sole proprietorships, stock corpo-
rations clearly dominate in our sample, with close to 80 percent of all firms
belonging to this group.9 This share looks surprisingly large compared to
Harhoff et al., where only about 4 percent of the firms are stock companies.
However, the difference may be explained by our exclusion of sole propri-
etorships and the fact that Swiss legislation makes the stock corporation
an attractive legal form even for small firms.
Finally, taking a look at industries, we observe that more than two-
thirds of the firms in our sample belong to the service sector (in the SBC
95 this share amounts to three-quarters of all firms). The vast majority of
previous studies had limited access to data on firms in the service sector (if
any). In the sample of Harhoff et al., for instance, only 30% of the firms
belong to the service sector.
8Harhoff et al. (1998, 467) in turn compare their results to the study of Wagner
(1994) for young firms and find that “the difference is small enough to be accounted for
by differences in industry composition.”
9In the SBC 95, where sole proprietorships are included, we find this group to have
the largest share (62.49 percent), at least in terms of their numbers; however, even there
the share of stock corporations still is considerable (30 percent).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Non-Exporting Exporting
Survival
Duration Lifetime of the Firm censored/truncated
Size & Age Mean Std.D. Mean Std.D.
Emp Number of Employees 10.22 48.56 14.26 64.48
Age 95 Firm Age in September 1995 34.42 28.44 33.43 28.19
Legal Form Value Fract. Value Fract.
Partner Partnership 0/1 15.50 0/1 8.67
Stock Corp Stock Corporation 0/1 76.99 0/1 84.88
Lim Liab Limited Liability Firm 0/1 7.51 0/1 6.45
Industries
Food Food & Textiles 0/1 0.97 0/1 1.51
Leather Leather & Paper 0/1 4.61 0/1 3.44
Chemicals Chemicals & Glass 0/1 1.02 0/1 2.78
Metals Metals etc. 0/1 2.91 0/1 4.05
Machines Machines & Equipment 0/1 2.90 0/1 10.10
Vehicles Vehicles. 0/1 0.20 0/1 0.42
Furniture Furniture, etc 0/1 0.93 0/1 1.30
Utilities Utilities (Energy & Water) 0/1 0.17 0/1 0.32
Construct Interior & Exterior Construction 0/1 15.29 0/1 4.75
Veh Trade Vehicles & Gas Trade 0/1 5.82 0/1 2.45
Wholesale Wholesale Trade 0/1 10.23 0/1 22.37
Retail Retail Trade 0/1 12.93 0/1 7.53
Restaurant Restaurants & Hotels. 0/1 4.81 0/1 1.59
Traffic Traffic & Communications 0/1 3.01 0/1 4.32
Banks Banks & Insurances 0/1 1.41 0/1 2.18
Real Estate Real Estate & Leasing 0/1 2.97 0/1 1.54
Data Data Processing & Data Bases 0/1 3.62 0/1 4.20
R&D Research & Development 0/1 0.11 0/1 0.37
Consulting Consulting 0/1 20.25 0/1 21.42
Education Education 0/1 0.80 0/1 0.52
Health Health Services 0/1 1.14 0/1 0.56
Waste Waste Treatment 0/1 0.26 0/1 0.10
Other Other Industries 0/1 3.63 0/1 2.20
Regions
Eastern CH Eastern CH 0/1 32.50 0/1 37.51
NW CH Northwestern CH 0/1 24.92 0/1 24.80
Central CH Central CH 0/1 9.89 0/1 11.74
French CH French CH 0/1 26.07 0/1 20.75
Italian CH Ticino 0/1 6.62 0/1 5.20
Macroeconomic Conditions Mean Std.D. Mean Std.D.
Ext Value External Currency Value 102.45 4.82 102.45 4.82
Bankrupt Number of Bankruptcies 45.70 4.78 45.70 4.78
Source: SCB95, DBED, SNB (2003), own calculations.
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3.2 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
We first explain the construction of our dependent variable and then discuss
the explanatory variables.
3.2.1 Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is the firm’s lifetime, measured by how many quar-
ters a firm stayed in business (Duration). As noted above, the DBED
contains three different types of exit: (i) bankruptcies, (ii) voluntary liq-
uidations, and (iii) mergers. In some studies, all three types of exit are
pooled (e.g., Dunne and Hughes 1994). Other studies use a more narrow
definition of exits—closely related to the concept of “failures”—excluding
mergers. In the following, we shall use a broad definition of exits and pool
all three types of exit.
In our sample, exits were recorded as bankruptcies if the firms filed for
bankruptcy between October 2, 1995, and December 31, 2000. For the
exact date of exit, we used the first available date which, in the bulk of
bankruptcy cases, is when the court instituted bankruptcy proceedings (as
opposed to the date when the firm finally ceased operations). This is due
to the fact that the spread between the opening of bankruptcy proceedings
and the actual closure varies considerably, depending, for instance, on the
size and the legal form of the firm. The other types of exit, voluntary
liquidations and mergers, were recorded when the respective firms were
deleted from the commercial register. The date when they actually ceased
operations would have been preferable, but was not available.
Using the founding and exit times, it is straightforward to calculate
the duration of a firm’s presence in the market. Note that the resulting
duration data is right censored ; that is, there are (many) firms that have
not left the pool during the survey period. For these firms, we know that
true duration is at least as large as observed duration. Furthermore, the
data is left truncated, as all the firms covered by the SBC 95 must have been
founded prior to October 1995 and thus have been at risk before coming
under observation (delayed entry). Both right censoring and left truncation
will have to be taken into account when modelling the probability of exit.
3.2.2 Explanatory Variables
In our sample, all values of firm attributes—including export shares—refer
to the date when the firm filed the relevant information for the business
9
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census (i.e., September 1995), similar to Harhoff et al. (1998) and Konings
and Xavier (2003). In most other studies, firm attributes refer to the date
of the firm’s founding. We are aware that some of these attributes—such
as the firm’s size—may change over the lifetime of the firm. Yet, as in
virtually all other studies on business failures, time-varying firm attributes
are not available. To deal with this problem, we control for the firm’s age
at the time of entering the sample (Age 95 ).
In virtually all previous studies, the size of a firm is operationalized by
its assets (Dunne and Hughes 1994, Ranger-Moore 1997) or by the number
of employees (Bru¨derl et al. 1992, Audretsch 1995, Harhoff et al. 1998). It
is common to log transform the size variable as it is natural to assume that
the marginal effects of size on exit probabilities decrease. In the present
study, we measure size by the natural log of the number of employees
(LnEmp); additionally, we include the square of this variable to test for
non-monotonicity ((LnEmp)2).10
We classify the legal form of firms into four groups, which differ with
respect to the initial capital requirements (Bru¨derl and Schu¨ssler 1990),
ease of ownership transfer and liability rules (Harhoff et al. 1998) as well as
tax treatment: (i) Partnerships (Partner), (ii) limited liability companies
(Lim Liab), and (iii) stock corporations (Stock Corp). As noted above,
the fourth legal form, sole proprietorships, had to be dropped because the
DBED does not fully cover the failures of these firms.
The SBC 95 further contains information on the nature of the firms’
businesses. In our sample, we use 23 dummy variables to control for
industry-specific effects. This industry categorization represents the equiva-
lent of the two-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code for Switzer-
land. In a simpler specification, we also use the following aggregated in-
dustry sectors: Manufacturing (Manufact), construction (Construct), trade
(Trade), and services (Service).
Furthermore, we use a classification issued by BFS (1997) to control for
geographical idiosyncrasies. That is, we use the following five dummy vari-
ables to indicate the location of a firm: Eastern Switzerland, including the
greater Zurich area and Graubu¨nden (Eastern CH ), Northwestern Switzer-
land (NW CH ), Central Switzerland (Central CH ), the French-speaking
area (French CH ), and the Italian-speaking area (Italian CH ). Eastern
CH will serve as the reference variable.
Since a crucial aspect of our study will be to compare the impact of the
10Alternative specifications of firm size (e.g., the number of apprentices or the sales
area) can be found in Kaiser (2004).
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change in antitrust law on non-exporting and exporting firms, we control
for the export share of a firm, calculated as the exports/turnover ratio in
September 1995. The database distinguishes the following firm types with
respect to export activity: (i) Non-exporting firms, (ii) exporting firms
with export shares below one-third, (iii) exporting firms with export shares
between one-third and two-thirds, and (iv) exporting firms with export
shares above two-thirds. We use the non-exporting firms (Non-Exporting)
as the reference group and pool all other firms in the group of exporting
firms (Exporting).
In addition, we use a number of time-varying explanatory variables.
The most important ones are dummy variables representing the change
in antitrust law in July 1996. In a basic specification, we use the single
dummy variable AL, which is set to zero until the second quarter of 1996
and set to one after that. In a refined specification, we use a series of
time dummies to assess how the change in antitrust law affected exit rates
over time. Another time-varying variable controls for the external value
of the Swiss currency (the Swiss Franc), using an index based on the real
exchange rates with the 24 most important trade partners published by the
Swiss National Bank (SNB) (2003) (Ext Val).11
Finally, we use a variable controlling for the aggregate movement of the
economy in previous years, as in other studies with time-varying covariates.
For instance, Van Kranenburg et al. (2002) use the lagged total number of
firms while Ranger-Moore (1997) and Roberts and Thompson (2003) use
the lagged aggregate number of failures or exits, respectively. We include
the lagged number of bankruptcies (Bankrupt), generated by aggregating
the yearly bankruptcies listed in the DBED.12 We would expect that a
higher number of bankruptcies in the previous year increases hazard rates
because of ‘chain effects’ (at work both within and across industries) that
trigger further exits.13
11We employ a one-year lag specification, so that values between 1994 and 1999 are
used for the estimation.
12This number is based on all firms, including those not meeting the requirements of
the SBC 95.
13We use bankruptcies instead of failures (including voluntary liquidations) because
we believe that detrimental chain effects are more strongly exerted by bankruptcies than
by voluntary liquidations.
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Table 2: Exit Rates by Age and Size
Exit Rates∗
(Failure Rates %, Merger Rates %)
Number of Observations
Firm Age in Firm Size in Sept. 1995
Sept. 1995 1-19 20-49 50-99 100 Total
<2 21.5 15.0 11.3 10.3 21.1
(20.9,0.6) (13.1,2.0) (7.8,3.5) (6.9,3.4) (20.4,0.7)
13,365 512 141 87 14,105
2 17.6 17.4 8.9 14.0 17.4
(16.9,0.7) (13.8,3.6) (6.3,2.5) (9.3,4.7) (16.5,0.9)
5,121 224 79 43 5,467
3 18.2 10.6 7.7 20.8 17.6
(17.4,0.8) (8.6,2.0) (7.7,0.0) (14.6,6.3) (16.8,0.9)
4,379 245 78 48 4,750
4 15.7 14.4 9.5 9.3 15.5
(14.9,0.8) (11.9,2.5) (5.4,4.1) (7.0,2.3) (14.5,1.0)
4,658 277 74 43 5,052
5-9 14.8 9.8 10.0 7.4 14.3
(14.1,0.7) (8.6,1.1) (7.9,2.1) (5.0,2.5) (13.6,0.8)
16,858 1,261 331 202 18,652
10-14 12.8 10.0 12.1 8.3 12.5
(12.1,0.6) (9.3,0.7) (10.2,1.9) (6.9,1.4) (11.8,0.7)
10,277 1,012 264 144 11,697
15-25 10.9 8.3 10.4 6.6 10.4
(10.1,0.7) (7.1,1.2) (8.4,2.0) (4.8,1.9) (9.6,0.8)
12,297 1,683 537 377 14,894
Total 15.6 10.5 10.4 8.6 15.1
(14.9,0.7) (9.1,1.4) (8.2,2.2) (6.0,2.4) (14.3,0.8)
66,955 5,214 1,504 944 74,617
∗The respective rates indicate the fraction of firms in the cell that exited during
the sample period (1999IV-2000IV).
3.3 Preliminaries on the Impact of Size and Age
Table 2 provides the sample frequencies of exits (in percentages)—broken
down into failures and mergers—by firm size and firm age. It largely sup-
ports the finding of the previous literature that exit rates tend to decrease
with age (Stinchcombe 1965, Caroll 1983, Amburgey et al. 1993, Olzak
and West 1991, Mata and Portugal 1994, Audretsch et al. 2000) and size
(Bru¨derl et al. 1992, Barron 1999, Audretsch et al. 2000, Agarwal and
Audretsch 2001, Segarra and Callejo´n 2002).
More specifically, looking at exits by age (rightmost column), we find
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that exit rates decrease monotonically, with the exception of a negligible
rebound for three-year-old firms. The overall decrease is more than 50
percent, from 21.1 percent for firms younger than two years to 10.4 percent
for firms up to 25 years old. For size (bottom row) the decrease is strictly
monotonic and amounts to about 45 percent from the smallest to the largest
size class. Since the vast majority of exits are failures rather than mergers,
these findings similarly apply to failures.
Our figures for age dependence resemble those of Harhoff et al. (1998).
Our total average failure rate is 14.3 percent compared with theirs of 10.1
percent. The difference can be explained by our slightly longer observation
period and the fact that we excluded the oldest firms (which should be
expected to experience below-average failure rates). Moreover, our pattern
of failure rates by size resembles theirs in the sense that an age-dependent
decline can be observed for the smallest firms, whereas for larger firms,
failure rates vary non-monotonically with age and do not show a clear
pattern. Hence, for small firms, getting older clearly lowers exit rates; for
large firms, the advantages of age are less obvious. However, the bulk of
firms in our sample are small, so that their negative duration dependence
dominates our findings for the full sample.
As noted above, in addition to failures, exits as defined in the present
study include mergers. Our figures show that the propensity to merge rises
with the size of the firm, whereas the firm’s age does not appear to make
a substantial difference. If we look at particular entries in Table 2, we find
that firms that are both large and rather young are likely to merge.14
4 Empirical Model and Results
Duration models provide a suitable framework for characterizing the prob-
ability of exit. Let Ti, i = 1, ..., n, denote the continuous duration of firm
i’s survival in the market. The probability distribution of firm i’s duration
is characterized by Fi(t) = Pr(Ti < t), which determines the probability
that firm i exits before some t. The corresponding density function is fi(t).
Let Si(t) = Pr(Ti ≥ t) = 1− Fi(t) denote the survivor function, which de-
termines the probability that Ti is equal or larger than t. In the following
we shall often refer to the hazard function
hi(t) = lim
dt→0
Pr (Ti ∈ [t, t+ dt]|Ti ≥ t)
dt
=
fi(t)
Si(t)
,
14Buehler et al. (2005) provide a more detailed analysis of mergers vs. failures.
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which, somewhat loosely, is the rate at which firm i exits at time t, given
that it has not exited before, as a function of t. The value of this function
is called the “hazard rate” or simply the “hazard” (Kiefer 1988; Van den
Berg 2001).
4.1 The Cox Model
The Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1972, 1975) is the most popu-
lar approach towards characterizing the hazard function hi(t) by a vector
of observed explanatory variables or covariates. Following Therneau and
Grambsch (2000, 39), we use xij, j = 1, ..., p, to denote the jth covariate
of firm i, denote the set of covariates by the n × p matrix x, and let xi
denote the row vector of firm i’s covariates. The Cox model then specifies
the hazard function for firm i as
hi(t|xi) = h0(t) exp(xiβ),
where h0(t) is an unspecified non-negative “baseline hazard” which gives
the shape of firm i’s hazard function, exp(xiβ) is the systematic part of
the hazard, and β is the coefficient vector. This model is known as the
“proportional hazards” model since, for any two firms i and k, k 6= i, and
fixed covariates xi and xk, we immediately have that
hi(t|xi)
hk(t|xk) =
exp(xiβ)
exp(xkβ)
is constant over time. The parameters β may be estimated consistently
by maximizing a partial likelihood function that does not depend on the
baseline hazard (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 1980).
Clearly, the proportional hazards property no longer holds when (some
of) the covariates vary over time, as in our case. Nevertheless, we can
derive valid econometric inference using the standard Cox model provided
that the following conditions are satisfied (Van den Berg 2001, 3398):
(i) x(t) is a predictable stochastic process. The concept of predictability
stems from the counting process literature and essentially requires
that the explaining variables are weakly exogenous (Ridder and Tu-
nalı 1999, 196). More specifically, predictability implies that the value
of xi(t) is known infinitesimally before t, at time t
− or even earlier.
Put differently, information on the value of xi at time t does not help
to predict a transition at t.
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(ii) The realizations of x(t) and exp(xi(t)β), i = 1, ..., n, are bounded.
In the present context, it is natural to assume that conditions (i) and (ii)
are satisfied. First, consider condition (i). Predictability is satisfied, since
our event time scale is discrete and we generally use lagged time-varying co-
variates (time-invariant covariates are trivially predictable). Next, consider
condition (ii). Our time-varying covariates are the time dummies represent-
ing the change in antitrust law, the number of bankruptcies (Bankrupt),
and the external value of the Swiss Franc (Ext Val). Clearly, both the
time dummies and Bankrupt are bounded below and above by definition.15
Finally, basic economic intuition suggests that Ext Val is bounded below
and above too.16
We shall therefore apply the standard Cox model below to estimate the
impact of the change in antitrust law. With time-varying covariates, the
Cox model is given by
hi(t|xi(t)) = lim
dt→0
Pr (Ti ∈ [t, t+ dt]|Ti ≥ t, {xi(u)}tu=0)
dt
= h0(t) exp(xi(t)β),
where {xi(u)}tu=0 denotes the time path of xi up to t, that is, xi is replaced
by xi(t) (see Van den Berg 2001, 3397).
4.2 Results
In this section, we present our estimation results.17 To interpret these
results, observe that we do not report the estimated coefficients β̂j, j =
1, ..., p, but the estimated hazard ratios
Ĥj =
ĥ(t| xj = x0j(t) + 1,x−j(t))
ĥ(t|xj = x0j(t),x−j(t))
= exp(β̂j), j = 1, ..., p,
where x−j(t) = (x1(t), ..., xj−1(t), xj+1(t), ..., xp(t)) . The hazard ratio is the
factor by which the hazard function is multiplied if the covariate xj increases
15The time dummies are either zero or one by definition. The number of bankruptcies
(Bankrupt), in turn, is zero at the minimum; at the maximum, it equals the number of
firms in the market.
16The minimum of Ext Val is zero by definition. As to the maximum, observe that
for Ext Val to go to infinity, the currency values of the most important trade partners
(measured in Swiss Francs) would have to approach zero.
17We employed Stata 8, using the commands stsplit and stcox.
15
Buehler et al.: Competition Policy and Exit Rates
by one unit. That is, if Ĥj = 1, the hazard rate does not change in response
to a change in covariate j, whereas the hazard increases (decreases) if Ĥj >
1 (Ĥj < 1, respectively).
4.2.1 Basic Specification
Table 3 presents the results from estimating three models that differ with
respect to sample composition. The left column reports the estimated
hazard ratios for the full sample, whereas the middle and right columns
report the estimates for the subsamples of non-exporting and exporting
firms, respectively. Our main interest lies in examining the impact of the
change in antitrust law in July 1996. In this basic specification, we represent
the change in antitrust law by a single dummy variable AL, which is zero
before and one after the change.18
The pooled regression suggests that the change in antitrust law pro-
duced a significant overall increase in hazard rates of roughly 30 percent.
This increase in hazard rates is consistent with the idea that the tighten-
ing of antitrust law lowered the degree of collusion in domestic markets.
However, to substantiate the claim that the increase in hazard rates was
generated by more intense competition—rather than some other exogenous
“shock” occurring at the same time—it is necessary to compare the effects
of the change in antitrust law on firms that are likely to be affected and
firms that are not. As pointed out above, this is done by comparing the
impact on non-exporting firms with the impact on exporting firms already
facing competition in international markets. The estimated hazard ratios
for these models show that the non-exporting firms were the only ones
significantly affected by the change in antitrust law. They suffered a sig-
nificant increase of hazard rates of more than 30 percent. Exporting firms,
in contrast, were not significantly affected by the change in antitrust law.
Together, these findings suggest that the change in antitrust law indeed
raised the intensity of competition in domestic markets, whereas compe-
tition in international markets remained largely unaffected.19 The pooled
regression further indicates that the firm’s export activity is an important
determinant of the hazard rate in its own right: Exporting firms are found
to have a significantly lower hazard ratio than non-exporting firms.
Concerning size, the pooled regression shows that both the natural log
18We consider a less restrictive representation of the change in antitrust law below.
19Since the vast majority of firms in our sample are non-exporting, the overall impact
estimated by the pooled regression is nevertheless large and significant.
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Table 3: Estimated Hazard Ratios – Basic Specification
Variable All Non-Exporting Exporting
Coeff. St.E Coeff. St.E. Coeff. Std.E.
Antitrust
AL 1.312∗∗∗ 0.075 1.369∗∗∗ 0.087 1.070 0.140
Export Orientation
Export 0.954∗ 0.024
Size & Age
LnEmp 0.737∗∗∗ 0.016 0.730∗∗∗ 0.018 0.739∗∗∗ 0.034
(LnEmp)2 1.036∗∗∗ 0.005 1.043∗∗∗ 0.006 1.024∗∗ 0.011
Age 95 0.951∗∗∗ 0.004 0.956∗∗∗ 0.004 0.929∗∗∗ 0.008
Legal Form
Stock Corp 0.689∗∗∗ 0.018 0.686∗∗∗ 0.020 0.698∗∗∗ 0.054
Lim Liab 0.735∗∗∗ 0.030 0.735∗∗∗ 0.033 0.727∗∗∗ 0.076
Industry
Construction 1.240∗∗∗ 0.048 1.173∗∗∗ 0.049 1.899∗∗∗ 0.242
Trade 1.097∗∗∗ 0.034 1.073∗ 0.039 1.097 0.066
Services 0.959 0.029 0.919∗∗ 0.033 1.038 0.062
Region
NW CH 1.068∗∗ 0.029 1.069∗∗ 0.032 1.077 0.061
Central CH 1.025 0.037 1.051 0.044 0.946 0.070
French CH 1.204∗∗∗ 0.031 1.236∗∗∗ 0.036 1.083 0.061
Italian CH 1.231∗∗∗ 0.049 1.212 0.055 1.303∗∗∗ 0.107
Macroeconomic Conditions
Ext Value 1.061∗∗∗ 0.007 1.059∗∗∗ 0.008 1.074∗∗∗ 0.016
Bankrupt 1.065∗∗∗ 0.006 1.064∗∗∗ 0.006 1.072∗∗∗ 0.013
Statistics
X 2 (all variables) 1961.73∗∗∗ 1447.06∗∗∗ 519.54∗∗∗
Log Likelihood −97328.0 −74157.3 −17805.2
No. of Obs. 68,681 52,463 16,219
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Dummy Coding
AL: before revision (0), after revision (1);
Export : Non-Exporting (0), Exporting (1);
Legal Form: Partnership (ref. var.), Stock Corp, Lim Liab;
Industry: Manufacturing (ref. var.), Construct, Trade, Services;
Region: Eastern CH (ref. var.), NW CH, Central CH, French CH, Italian CH.
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of the number of employees (LnEmp) and its square ((LnEmp)2) are sig-
nificant. The hazard-reducing effect of LnEmp is countered by a hazard-
increasing effect of (LnEmp)2. This indicates that size advantages decrease
up to an “optimal size”. Further increases of size lead to an increase in
hazard rates, giving rise to a ∪-shaped relationship between the number
of employees and hazard rates. This result, which is supported by the
estimation results for the other models, is remarkable as it is commonly
accepted that size is positively related to the likelihood of survival.20 How-
ever, many earlier studies have not really addressed the question whether
there is a monotone relationship between size and survival, using only one
size term. Our results add to studies by Wholey et al. (1992), Dunne
and Hughes (1994), Ranger-Moore (1997), Harhoff et al. (1998) and Chen
(2002), which suggest that the relation between size and survival may be
nonmonotone at least for some industries. In line with the bulk of the
literature, we also find that hazard rates decrease with age (Age 95 ) (see
Carroll 1983, Olzak and West 1991, Amburgey et al. 1993, Mata and Por-
tugal 1994, and Audretsch et al. 2000).
Table 3 further indicates that legal form is an important determinant
of firm survival. Stock corporations have lower hazard rates than non-
corporate firms. Partnerships (reference variable) are generally most likely
to fail, followed by limited liability companies (with a hazard ratio of 0.735)
and stock corporations (with a hazard ratio of 0.689). This suggests that
the advantages of stock corporations, such as higher initial capital require-
ments, better access to financial capital, and easier transfer of ownership,
apparently dominate their disadvantages due to less risk-averse behavior re-
sulting from limited liability. Our results generally support the rankings of
previous studies, such as King and Wicker (1988) and Harhoff et al. (1998).
In this basic specification, we distinguish only the following main indus-
try sectors : Manufacturing (reference variable), construction, trade, and
services. It stands out that hazard rates for construction are much higher
than those for other industries. Harhoff et al. (1998), in contrast, obtained
the lowest hazard rates for construction.21 Potential explanations for the
high hazard rates in our case include falling real estate prices and falling
20Agarwal and Audretsch (2001, 22) note that “virtually every study undertaken has
found that size is positively related to the likelihood of survival.”
21However, for bankruptcies they also obtained the highest hazard rates for construc-
tion, in line with results of Kaiser (2004), who uses the database employed in the present
paper.
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construction expenses during the survey period.22
Regarding the regions where firms are located, it is noteworthy that
hazard rates in the non-German speaking regions are generally significantly
higher than in the German speaking regions. More specifically, relative
to the German speaking reference region Eastern CH, which includes the
greater Zurich area, all regions (except German speaking Central CH ) suffer
from significantly higher hazard rates.
Finally, we consider the impact of macroeconomic conditions on hazard
rates. Here, we controlled for the external value of the Swiss currency (Ext
Val), as its fluctuation influences the exits of firms disparately, subject to
their export activity, and its omission could seriously distort findings on
the change of antitrust law. We find the external value to be significant
in all models. As expected, an increase in the external value of the Swiss
currency raises hazard rates, as it deteriorates the competitiveness of Swiss
firms in foreign markets and increases the competitiveness of foreign firms
in Swiss markets. Furthermore, we included the number of bankruptcies in
the previous year (Bankrupt) to control for “chain effects” associated with
the general business climate.23 For all models, we find the expected result
that the number of lagged bankruptcies raises the propensity to exit.
4.2.2 Refined Specification
Next, we present the results from a refined specification that differs from
the simple specification in Table 3 in two ways:
(i) Rather than representing the change in antitrust policy by a single
dummy variable, we use a series of time dummies. This allows us to
assess how the change in antitrust legislation affected exit rates over
time. In particular, we examine whether the regime change coincided
with the increase in exit rates, and whether the increase in exit rates
(if any) was temporary in nature.24
22According to figures published by SNB (2003), the price index for apartments fell
by 23.31 percent from 1994 to 1999; other real estate prices also showed significant
decreases. For instance, for one-family houses prices dropped by 13.54 percent and for
sales areas by 16.64 percent.
23An additional business cycle indicator released by the Swiss Institute for Business
Cycle Research (KOF-ETH) turned out to be insignificant and was excluded.
24To avoid collinearity problems, we constructed a dummy variable for the time before
the regime change in July 1996 and combined the years 1999 and 2000 (using a higher
number of time dummies proved to be non-feasible).
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(ii) We replace the control variables for the broad industry sectors (man-
ufacturing, construction, trade, and services) by a larger set of dum-
mies (23 variables) allowing for a finer control of industry-specific
effects. The refined industry categorization essentially represents the
equivalent of the two-digit SIC code for Switzerland.25
Table 4 presents the results from estimating the refined specification of
the model. First, we focus on the question of how the change in antitrust
legislation affected exit rates over time. As for the simple specification, the
estimates indicate that the regime change lead to a significant increase in
hazard rates of about 30 percent, both for the full sample and the subsample
of non-exporting firms.
However, as Figure 1 illustrates, the effect of the regime change on exit
rates was probably less persistent than the simple specification in Table 3
suggests: Exit rates increased significantly with the enacting of the revised
antitrust law in the second half of 1996 (indicated by the dummy variable
96b) and then tended to fall again. That is, the effect on exit rates coincided
with the regime change and was largely temporary in nature. We think
that the coincidence of the regime change and the increase in hazard rates
is particularly noteworthy, as the regime change was made public and thus
anticipated by firms.
Second, we consider the more detailed industry categorization in the
refined specification. Here, it stands out that exit rates are highest in the
food & textiles industry (Food, reference variable) and the construction
industry (Construct). Table 4 further shows that exit rates are particu-
larly low in industries where public adminstration or regulation plays an
important role, such as waste treatment (Waste), energy & water utilities
(Utilities), R&D, and Eduction. The hazard ratios for these variables are
all significant (at least for the full sample), whereas those of many other
industries are not significant.26
25We had to aggregate some of these industries, though, to have a sufficient number
of observations in each industry.
26In part, this may be due to the relatively small number of firms in some industries.
20
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 4 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Table 4: Estimated Hazard Ratios – Refined Specification
Variable All Non-Exporting Exporting
Coeff. St.E Coeff. St.E. Coeff. Std.E.
Antitrust
96b 1.299∗∗∗ 0.077 1.341∗∗∗ 0.089 1.078 0.141
97 1.268 0.295 1.349 0.337 0.462 0.275
98 1.232 0.619 1.262 0.685 0.237 0.300
99/00 1.162 0.552 1.181 0.601 0.222 0.271
Export Orientation
Export 0.975 0.025
Size & Age
LnEmp 0.728∗∗∗ 0.016 0.718∗∗∗ 0.018 0.734∗∗∗ 0.034
(LnEmp)2 1.037∗∗∗ 0.005 1.045∗∗∗ 0.006 1.024∗∗ 0.010
Age 95 0.946∗∗∗ 0.006 0.950∗∗∗ 0.007 0.899∗∗∗ 0.018
Legal Form
Stock Corp 0.713∗∗∗ 0.019 0.712∗∗∗ 0.021 0.698∗∗∗ 0.054
Lim Liab 0.751∗∗∗ 0.031 0.751∗∗∗ 0.034 0.719∗∗∗ 0.076
Industry
Leather 0.853 0.087 0.806∗ 0.095 0.982 0.202
Chemicals 0.770∗∗ 0.097 0.897 0.139 0.671∗ 0.148
Metals 0.737∗∗∗ 0.080 0.718∗∗∗ 0.092 0.783 0.161
Machines 0.738∗∗∗ 0.075 0.718∗∗∗ 0.091 0.818 0.148
Vehicles 0.642∗ 0.151 0.612 0.183 0.706 0.270
Furniture 0.982 0.124 0.983 0.146 0.966 0.238
Utilities 0.608∗ 0.165 0.303∗∗∗ 0.136 1.220 0.446
Construct 1.000∗∗∗ 0.094 0.930 0.102 1.583∗∗ 0.326
Veh Trade 0.784∗∗ 0.796 0.731∗∗∗ 0.085 1.078 0.247
Wholesale 0.845∗ 0.079 0.846 0.094 0.856 0.150
Retail 0.948 0.890 0.895 0.098 1.105 0.206
Restaurant 0.944 0.097 0.894 0.104 1.091 0.406
Traffic 0.909 0.094 0.843 0.104 1.045 0.202
Banks 0.971 0.111 0.831 0.114 1.371 0.281
Real Estate 0.696∗∗∗ 0.078 0.644∗∗∗ 0.082 1.104 0.309
Data 0.710∗∗∗ 0.074 0.654∗∗∗ 0.080 0.858 0.167
R&D 0.631∗ 0.167 0.542 0.210 0.764 0.829
Consulting 0.670∗∗∗ 0.650 0659∗∗∗ 0.072 0.791 0.139
Education 0.635∗∗∗ 0.100 0.621∗∗∗ 0.107 0.574 0.237
Health 0.664∗∗∗ 0.095 0.619∗∗∗ 0.097 0.809 0.358
Waste 0.413∗∗∗ 0.130 0.390∗∗∗ 0.130 0.498 0.475
Other 0.975 0.100 0.968 0.114 0.744 0.175
—————————— Table continued on next page ——————————
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Table 4: Estimated Hazard Ratios – Refined Specification (continued)
Variable All Non-Exporting Exporting
Coeff. St.E Coeff. St.E. Coeff. Std.E.
Region
NW CH 1.068∗∗ 0.029 1.068∗∗ 0.032 1.080 0.062
Central CH 1.024 0.037 1.047 0.043 0.955 0.071
French CH 1.189∗∗∗ 0.031 1.220∗∗∗ 0.036 1.060 0.061
Italian CH 1.198∗∗∗ 0.048 1.170 0.054 1.300∗∗∗ 0.107
Macroeconomic Conditions
Ext Value 1.058∗∗∗ 0.018 1.052∗∗∗ 0.019 1.050 0.042
Bankrupt 1.065∗∗∗ 0.025 1.062∗∗ 0.027 1.152∗∗ 0.066
Statistics
X 2 (all variables) 2095.26∗∗∗ 1588.71∗∗∗ 579.45∗∗∗
Log Likelihood −97265.64 −74099.26 −17781.34
No. of Obs. 68,681 52,463 16,219
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ Coefficients are significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Dummy Coding
95/96a (ref. var.), 96b, 97, 98, 99/00 : Time Dummies (0/1);
Export : Non-Exporting (0), Exporting (1);
Legal Form: Partnership (ref. var.), Stock Corp, Lim Liab;
Industry: Food (ref. var.);
Region: Eastern CH (ref. var.), NW CH, Central CH, French CH, Italian CH.
All Firms
95/96a 96b 97 98 99/00
0
1
2
3
4 Point Estimate
95% Conf. Bound
Non-Exporting Firms
95/96a 96b 97 98 99/00
0
1
2
3
4 Point Estimate
95% Conf. Bound
Exporting Firms
95/96a 96b 97 98 99/00
0
1
2
3
4 Point Estimate
95% Conf. Bound
Figure 1: Hazard Ratios for Time Dummies (Refined Specification)
Another important difference between the basic and the refined speci-
fication concerns the role of a firm’s export activity. With the basic speci-
fication, the export activity is estimated to be a significant determinant of
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the hazard rate, whereas it is not significant with the refined specification
(even though the numerical estimates are fairly similar).
Finally, we note that the basic and the refined specification yield similar
estimates for the other variables controlling for size, age, legal form, and
so on.
5 Conclusion
We have focused on the question of how an increase in the intensity of
product-market competition affects the probability of exit, where the latter
may come about by bankruptcy, merger, or voluntary liquidation.
Viewing a rather drastic change in Swiss antitrust legislation in 1996
as an event that generated plausibly exogenous variation in the intensity
of competition, we adopted a natural experiment approach to study the
relationship between the intensity of competition and the probability of
exit.
We established the following main results. First, the change in Swiss
antitrust legislation in 1996 led to a significant temporary increase of haz-
ard rates for Swiss firms. Second, whereas non-exporting firms suffered
from a significant increase in hazard rates, exporting firms were not signif-
icantly affected. Third, our estimates for the other standard determinants
of hazard rates are in line with previous literature.
In sum, our results support the notion that there is a positive relation-
ship between the intensity of competition and the probability of exit.
References
Agarwal, R., Gort, M. (1996), The Evolution of Markets and Entry, Exit
and Survival of Firms, Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 489-
498.
Agarwal, R., Audretsch, D. (2001), Does Entry Size Matter? The Im-
pact of the Life Cycle and Technology on Firm Survival, Journal of
Industrial Economics 49, 21-43.
Amburgey, T.L., Kelly, D., Barnett, W.P. (1993), Resetting the Clock:
The Dynamics of Organizational Change and Failure, Administrative
Science Quarterly 38, 51-73.
23
Buehler et al.: Competition Policy and Exit Rates
Audretsch, D.B. (1995), Innovation and Industry Evolution, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Audretsch, D.B., Houweling, P., Thurik, A.R. (2000), Firm Survival in
the Netherlands, Review of Industrial Organization 16, 1-11.
Barron, D.N. (1999), The Structuring of Organizational Populations, Amer-
ican Sociological Review 64, 421-445.
Van den Berg, G.J. (2001), Duration models: Specification, identifica-
tion, and multiple durations, in: J.J. Heckman and E. Leamer (eds.),
Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. V, North Holland, Amsterdam,
3381-3460.
BFS (Swiss Federal Statistical Office) (1997), Die Raumgliederung der
Schweiz (The spatial structure of Switzerland), 2nd edition, Bern.
Bhattacharjee, A., Higson, C., Holly, S., Kattuman, P. (2003), Business
Failure in UK and US quoted firms: Impact of macro-economic insta-
bility and the role of legal systems. Paper presented at the EARIE
2003 conference, Helsinki.
Bittlingmayer, G. (1985), Did Antitrust Policy Cause the Great Merger
Wave?, Journal of Law and Economics 28, 77-118.
Borner, S., Brunetti, A., Weder, R. (1995), O¨konomische Analyse zur
Revision des schweizerischen Kartellgesetzes (Economic Analysis of
the Revision of Swiss Antitrust Law), in: Za¨ch, R., Zweifel, P. (eds.),
Grundfragen der schweizerischen Kartellrechtsreform. Dike, St. Gal-
len, 35-92.
Bru¨derl, J., Preisendo¨rfer, P., Ziegler, R. (1992), Survival Chances of
Newly Founded Business Organizations, American Sociological Re-
view 57, 227-242.
Bru¨derl, J., Schu¨ssler, R. (1990), Organizational Mortality: The Liabilities
of Newness and Adolescence, Administrative Science Quarterly 35,
530-547.
Buehler, S., Kaiser, C., Jaeger F. (2005), Merge or Fail? The Determinants
of Mergers and Bankruptcies in Switzerland, 1995-2000, Economics
Letters, forthcoming.
24
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 4 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Carroll, G. (1983), A Stochastic Model of Organizational Mortality: Re-
view and Reanalysis, Social Science Research 12, 303-329.
Chen, M. Y. (2002), Survival Duration of Plants: Evidence from the US
Petroleum Refining Industry, International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization 20, 517-555.
Cox, D.R. (1975), Partial Likelihood, Biometrika 62, 269-276.
— — (1972), Regression Models and Life-Tables, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series B34, 187-220.
Dunne, P., Hughes, A. (1994), Age Size, Growth and Survival: UK Com-
panies in the 1980s, Journal of Industrial Economics 42, 115-140.
Elliot, D.C., Gribbin, J.D. (1977), The Abolition of Cartels and Structural
Change in the United Kingdom, in: Jacquemin, A.P., de Jong, H.W.
(eds.), Welfare Aspects of Industrial Markets, Nijhoff, Leiden.
Harhoff, D., Stahl, K., Woywode, M. (1998), Legal Form, Growth and Exit
of West German Firms—Empirical Results for Manufacturing, Con-
struction, Trade and Service Industries, Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 46, 453-488.
Kaiser, C. (2004), Factors Determining Firm Survival: Empirical Evi-
dence from Swiss Manufacturing, Construction, Trade and Service
Industries, Doctoral Thesis University of St. Gallen.
Kalbfleisch, J.D., Prentice, R.L. (1980), The Statistical Analysis of Failure
Time Data. John Wiley and Sons, New York.
Kiefer, N.M. (1988), Economic Duration and Hazard Functions, Journal
of Economic Literature 26, 646-679.
King, J.C., Wicker, A.W. (1988), The Population Demography of Or-
ganizations: An Application to Retail and Service Establishments,
Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings, 373-377.
Klepper, S., Graddy, E. (1990), The Evolution of New Industries and the
Determinants of Market Structure, Rand Journal of Economics 21,
27-44.
25
Buehler et al.: Competition Policy and Exit Rates
Konings, J., Xavier, A. (2003), Firm Perfomance and Selection in an
Emerging Economy: Micro Evidence from Slovenia, Paper presented
at the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003, Warwick.
Van Kranenburg, H.L., Palm, F.C., Pfann, G.A. (2002), Exit and Survival
in a Concentrating Industry: The Case of Daily Newspapers in the
Netherlands, Review of Industrial Organization 21, 283-303.
Mata, J., Portugal, P. (1994), Life Duration of New Firms, Journal of
Industrial Economics 42, 227-245.
Meyer, B.D. (1995), Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, Jour-
nal of Business & Economic Statistics 13, 151-161.
Neven, D., Ungern-Sternberg, T. (1997), Swiss Competition Policy in the
Last Decade, in: Bachetta, P., Wasserfallen, W. (eds.), Economic
Policy in Switzerland, MacMillan, London, 35-57.
O’Brien, D.P., Howe, W.S., Wright, D.M., O’Brien, R.J. (1979), Compe-
tition Policy, Profitability and Growth, Macmillan, London.
OECD (2000), Economic Survey—Switzerland 2000.
Olzak, S., West, E. (1991), Ethnic Conflict and the Rise of Ethnic News-
papers, American Sociological Review 56, 458-474.
Phlips, L. (1995), Competition Policy: A Game-Theoretic Perspective,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Porter, M.E. (1990), Competitive Advantage of Nations, Free Press, Lon-
don.
Ranger-Moore, J. (1997), Bigger May Be Better But Is Older Wiser?:
Organizational Age and Size in the New York Life Insurance Industry,
American Sociological Review 62, 903-920.
Ridder, G., Tunalı, I˙. (1999), Stratified Partial Likelihood Estimation,
Journal of Econometrics 92, 193-232.
Roberts, B.M., Thompson, S. (2003), Entry and Exit in a Transition Econ-
omy: The Case of Poland, Review of Industrial Organization 22, 225-
243.
26
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 4 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 15
Schmalensee, R. (1989), Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Perfor-
mance, in: Schmalensee, R., Willig, R.D. (eds.), Handbook of Indus-
trial Organization, Vol. 2, North Holland, Amsterdam, 951-1009.
Segarra, A., Callejo´n, M. (2002), New firms’ survival and Market Turbu-
lence: New Evidence from Spain, Review of Industrial Organization
20, 1-14.
Selten, R. (1984), Are Cartel Laws Bad for Business? in: Hauptmann, H.,
Krelle, W., Mosler, K.C. (eds.): Operations Research and Economic
Theory, Springer, Berlin etc.
Swiss National Bank (SNB) (2003), Statistisches Monatsheft (Monthly
Statistical Bulletin), May 2003.
Stinchcombe, A.L. (1965), Social Structure and Organizations, in: March,
J. (ed.), Handbook of Organizations, Rand McNally, Chicago, 142-193
Sutton, J. (1998), Technology and Market Structure. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
— — (1991), Sunk Costs and Market Structure. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA.
Symeonidis, G. (2000a), Price and Nonprice Competition With Endo-
geneous Market Structure, Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 9, 53-83.
— — (2000b), Price Competition and Market Structure: The Impact of
Cartel Policy on Concentration in the UK, Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics 48, 1-26.
Thernau, T.M., Grambsch, P.M. (2000), Modeling Survival Data. Extend-
ing the Cox Model. Springer, Berlin etc.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Wagner, J. (1994), The Post-Entry Performance of New Small Firms in
German Manufacturing Industries, Journal of Industrial Economics
42, 141-154.
27
Buehler et al.: Competition Policy and Exit Rates
Wholey, D.R., Christianson, J.B., Sanchez, S.M. (1992), Organizational
Size and Failure among Health Maintenance Organizations, American
Sociological Review 57, 829-842.
28
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy , Vol. 4 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 15
